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Abstract
We present a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm for computing dd+o(d)-approximate
(pure) Nash equilibria in weighted congestion games with polynomial cost functions of de-
gree at most d. This is an exponential improvement of the approximation factor with respect
to the previously best algorithm. An appealing additional feature of our algorithm is that it
uses only best-improvement steps in the actual game, as opposed to earlier approaches that
first had to transform the game itself. Our algorithm is an adaptation of the seminal algo-
rithm by Caragiannis et al. [7, 8], but we utilize an approximate potential function directly
on the original game instead of an exact one on a modified game.
A critical component of our analysis, which is of independent interest, is the derivation of
a novel bound of [d/W (d/ρ)]d+1 for the Price of Anarchy (PoA) of ρ-approximate equilibria
in weighted congestion games, where W is the Lambert-W function. More specifically, we
show that this PoA is exactly equal to Φd+1d,ρ , where Φd,ρ is the unique positive solution of the
equation ρ(x+1)d = xd+1. Our upper bound is derived via a smoothness-like argument, and
thus holds even for mixed Nash and correlated equilibria, while our lower bound is simple
enough to apply even to singleton congestion games.
1 Introduction
Congestion games constitute one of the most important and well-studied class of games in
the field of algorithmic game theory [32, 34, 36]. These games are tailored to model settings
where selfish players compete over sets of common resources. Prominent examples include
traffic routing in networks and load balancing games (see, e.g., [32, Chapters 18 and 20]). In
these games’ most general form, known as weighted congestion games, each player has her own
(positive) weight and the cost of a resource is a nondecreasing function of the total weight of
players using it. An important special case is that of unweighted games, where all players have
the same weight. The cost of a resource then depends only on the number of players using it.
Players are selfish and each one chooses a set of resources that minimizes her own cost. On
the other hand, a central authority would aim at minimizing social cost, that is, the sum of
players’ costs. It is well known that these two objectives do not, in general, align: due to the
selfish behavior of players, the game may reach a stable state (i.e., a Nash equilibrium [26, 31])
that is suboptimal in terms of social cost. This gap is formally captured by the fundamental
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notion of Price of Anarchy (PoA) [28], defined as the ratio between the social cost of the worst
equilibrium and that of an optimal solution enforced by a centralized authority.
From the seminal work of Rosenthal [33], we know that unweighted congestion games always
have (pure Nash) equilibria1. This is a direct consequence of the fact that they are potential
games [30]. However, finding such a stable state is, in general, computationally hard [1, 18]. An
important question then is whether one can efficiently compute approximate equilibria [7, 37].
These are states of the game where no player can unilaterally deviate and improve her cost by
more than a factor of ρ ≥ 1; (exact) equilibria correspond to the special case where ρ = 1.
The situation becomes even more challenging in the general setting of weighted congestion
games [8], where exact equilibria may not even exist [23]. Consequently, weighted congestion
games do not generally admit a potential function. Thus, in this setting one needs more sophisti-
cated approaches and approximation tools to establish computability of approximate equilibria.
This is precisely the problem we study in the present paper: the efficient computation of ρ-
approximate equilibria in weighted congestion games, with ρ as small as possible. We focus on
resource cost functions that are polynomials (with nonnegative coefficients), parametrized by
their degree d; this is a common assumption in the literature of congestion games (see, e.g.,
[36, 2, 11, 13, 23]).
1.1 Related Work
The potential function approach has long become a central tool for obtaining results about ex-
istence and computability of approximate equilibria in weighted congestion games. The concept
of a potential function for unweighted congestion games was proposed by Rosenthal [33], who
used it as a tool for proving existence of pure Nash equilibria in such games. Later, Monderer
and Shapley [30] formally introduced and studied extensively the class of potential games. As
it turns out, weighted congestion games do not admit a potential function in general, even for
“well-behaved” instances [29, 23, 21, 25]. Exceptions include games with linear and exponential
resource cost functions [25]. However, recently, Christodoulou et al. [13] showed that polynomial
weighted congestion games have an approximate analogue of a potential function, which they
called Faulhaber’s potential. An exact potential function decreases whenever a player improves
her cost, and even by the same amount. In contrast, the approximate potential of [13] is only
guaranteed to decrease when a player deviates and improves her cost by a factor of at least α.
Factor α is greater than 1, but at most d + 1, where d is the degree of the game. We will use
this approximate potential function in the analysis of our algorithm. Other approximate poten-
tial functions have been successfully used before [13] to establish the existence of approximate
equilibria in congestion games; see [9, 15, 24].
On the algorithmic side, there have been many negative results concerning exact equilibria in
various classes of congestion games. Fabrikant et al. [18] showed that even in the unweighted case
of a network congestion game, computing equilibria is PLS-complete. Dunkel and Schulz [17]
showed that it is strongly NP-complete to determine whether an equilibrium exists in a given
weighted congestion game. As a further negative result, Ackermann et al. [1] proved that
it is PLS-complete to compute equilibria even in the linear unweighted case. These hardness
results motivated the search for efficient methods to compute approximate equilibria. In general,
this is again a computationally hard problem; Skopalik and Vöcking [37] showed that for any
polynomially computable ρ, finding a ρ-approximate equilibrium in a congestion game is a PLS-
complete problem. The focus of research thus shifted towards searching for positive algorithmic
results for ρ-approximate equilibria of various special classes of weighted congestion games.
The first such result was obtained by Chien and Sinclair [10], who showed convergence of the
1In this paper we focus exclusively on pure Nash equilibria; this is standard in the congestion games literature.
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best-response dynamics, in symmetric unweighted congestion games with “well-behaved” cost
functions, to (1+ε)-approximate equilibria in polynomially many steps with respect to ε−1 and
the number of players.
The next significant positive result of this kind was obtained for approximate equilibria
in polynomial unweighted congestion games by Caragiannis et al. [7]. They showed how to
efficiently compute dO(d)-approximate equilibria in such games. Subsequently, Caragiannis et
al. [8] extended this result to the weighted case, achieving an approximation factor of d2d+o(d).
To the best of our knowledge, this has remained state-of-the-art ever since.2 In the present
paper, we reduce this factor to dd+o(d). The algorithm in [8] first transforms the original game
into a so-called approximating game defined for the same players and states. Specifically, it
runs on the so-called Ψ-game, which is an exact potential game where players’ costs are within
a factor of d! from their costs in the original polynomial game. Then it finds and returns a
state which is a dd+o(d)-approximate equilibrium in the new Ψ-game. In the original game, the
approximation factor of this state (which is the approximation guarantee of the algorithm) is
worse by the mentioned factor of d! and thus becomes d2d+o(d).
In the past few years, several new positive results have been obtained based on the al-
gorithm in [7, 8]. Feldotto et al. [20] explored PoA-like bounds on the potential function in
unweighted games. This enabled them to bound from above the approximation factor that
the algorithmic framework of [7] yields when applied to unweighted games with general cost
functions. Most recently, Feldotto et al. [19] designed a algorithm similar to [8] which com-
putes dd+o(d)-approximate equilibria in weighted congestion games. However, it is important to
note that their algorithm is randomized and finds dd+o(d)-approximate equilibria only with high
probability. The randomization is due to the fact that their variant of the algorithm is actually
applied to a modified game that uses the Shapley value [27] rule to share the total cost of a
resource among the players that use it. Computing players’ costs using this scheme is in fact
computationally hard, so instead those costs are estimated using a sampling approach.
The study of the Price of Anarchy (PoA) was initiated by Koutsoupias and Papadim-
itriou [28]. One of the first significant results concerning tight bounds on the PoA of atomic
congestion games was obtained by Awerbuch et al. [3] and Christodoulou and Koutsoupias [14].
They proved the tight bound of 5/2 on the exact PoA of linear unweighted congestion games.
In the next few years, several PoA results were obtained. For example, Gairing and Schopp-
mann [22] provided various upper and lower bounds for the exact PoA of singleton3 unweighted
congestion games. Subsequently, Aland et al. [2] introduced a systematic approach to upper-
bounding the exact PoA of polynomial weighted congestion games, which was later extended
to general classes of cost functions and named smoothness framework in [4, 35]. Aland et al. [2]
gave the tight bound of Φd+1d on the PoA of exact pure NE in polynomial weighted games,
where Φd is the unique root of the equation (x + 1)d = xd+1. Based on the same technique,
Christodoulou et al. [15] provided a tight bound on the PoA of ρ-approximate equilibria in
unweighted congestion games. It turned out to be equal to ρ((z+1)
2d+1−zd+1(z+2)d)
(z+1)d+1−zd+1−ρ((z+2)d−(z+1)d)
, where
z is the maximum integer that satisfies z
d+1
(z+1)d
< ρ. In our notation, this is equivalent to
z = ⌊Φd,ρ⌋.
Since the development of the smoothness method, other approaches to finding tight bounds
on the PoA have been investigated. Recently, Bilò [5] was able to rederive, through the use of a
primal-dual framework, the upper bound on the PoA of linear unweighted games from [14]. He
also provided a simplified lower bound instance. Furthermore, he was able to show the upper
2As far as deterministic solutions are concerned. See below for a discussion of the recent randomized algorithm
by Feldotto et al. [19].
3See Footnote 8 for a formal definition.
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bound of
(
ρ+
√
ρ2+4ρ
2
)2
on the PoA of ρ-approximate equilibria for the special case of linear
weighted games. It turns out to be equal to Φ21,ρ, the special case for d = 1 of the general tight
bound Φd+1d,ρ that we present below. Moreover, he provided matching instances with PoA equal
to Φ21,ρ, for ρ in a certain subset of [1,∞).
1.2 Our Results and Techniques
We study approximate (pure Nash) equilibria in polynomial weighted congestion games of de-
gree d. Our main result is a polynomial-time algorithm for computing dd+o(d)-approximate pure
Nash equilibria in such games. Improving the bound on the approximation guarantee of effi-
ciently computable approximate equilibria in polynomial weighted games was posed as an open
problem by Caragiannis et al. [8]. As a matter of fact, their paper provided the best known
bound on this approximation factor, namely d2d+o(d), before our paper.
Our algorithm, as well as the outline of its analysis, is based on the ideas in [8]. However,
there is a significant difference between our approach and previous ones. Our algorithm builds
a polynomially-long sequence of best-response moves in the actual game itself that, from any
given state, leads to a dd+o(d)-equilibrium. We then utilize, in the absence of an exact potential
function for the game, an approximate potential introduced by Christodoulou et al. [13] in order
to analyse the runtime and approximation guarantee. In contrast, the original algorithm of [8]
first replaces the input game with a modified, exact-potential approximating game (called Ψ-
game), then computes a dd+o(d) equilibrium there, and then projects it back into the original
game, at the expense of increasing the approximation guarantee by a factor of d!, which results
in the approximation guarantee d2d+o(d).
Our approach has a number of advantages, at the cost of our proofs being more involved
due to the use of an approximate, instead of an exact, potential. First, unlike in our algorithm,
the sequence of moves found by the algorithm in [8] needs not be a best-response sequence
when projected back into the original game.4 As a matter of fact, it may contain moves that
increase individual costs. Secondly, once an approximate equilibrium is found, we do not need
to project it back into the input game. This saves us a factor of d! compared to the original
algorithm. This is the main reason why our approximation factor goes down to dd+o(d). Third,
it turns out from our analysis that essentially our approximation guarantee corresponds to the
value of the PoA for (d+2)-approximate equilibria in the input game; so, we can deploy known
frameworks for studying the PoA of polynomial weighted games (see next paragraph) to derive
the necessary bound on the PoA, and thus to the approximation factor itself.
As a necessary tool for proving the approximation guarantee of the algorithm and as a
result of independent interest, we obtain a tight bound on the PoA of ρ-approximate equilibria,
denoted by PoAd(ρ), of polynomial weighted congestion games of degree d, for any ρ ≥ 1 and
degree d ≥ 1. It turns out to be equal to Φd+1d,ρ , where Φd,ρ is the unique positive solution of
the equation ρ(x + 1)d = xd+1. This bound generalizes the following results: the tight bound
of Φd+1d on the PoA (of exact equilibria) of weighted congestion games [2]; the tight bound
on the ρ-approximate PoA of unweighted congestion games [15]; and the upper bound on the
ρ-approximate PoA of linear weighted congestion games [5]. Our matching lower bound proof
extends an example from [22] that bounds the PoA of singleton unweighted congestion games.
As such, our lower bound is easily verified to hold for singleton and network weighted congestion
4In an attempt to address this issue, Caragiannis et al. [8] themselves present also a modification of their main
algorithm that actually runs in the original game, but unfortunately this leads to significantly worse approximation
guarantees of dO(d
2) in their case.
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games.5 To prove the upper bound, we essentially utilize the smoothness method developed in
[2, 4, 35]. The smoothness approach automatically extends the validity of our tight PoA bound
from pure Nash to mixed Nash and correlated equilibria as well [4, 35].
One further contribution is an analytic upper bound PoAd(ρ) ≤
[
d
W(d/ρ)
]d+1
, involving
the Lambert-W function. This bound adds to the understanding of the different asymptotic
behaviour of PoAd(ρ) with respect to each of the two parameters, d and ρ, and plays an
important role in deriving the desired approximation factor of dd+o(d) in the analysis of the
main algorithm of our paper. It is interesting to note here that this bound also generalizes, in
a smooth way with respect to ρ, a similar result presented in [13] for the special case of exact
equilibria (i.e., ρ = 1).
All proofs omitted from the main text can be found in the Appendix.
2 Model and Notation
We denote by R and R≥0 the set of real and nonnegative real numbers, respectively, and by Pd
the class of polynomials of degree at most d with nonnegative coefficients6. A well-established
notation in the literature of congestion games is that of Φd, for d a positive integer, as the unique
positive root of the equation (x+1)d = xd+1. Notice how, the special case of d = 1 corresponds
to the golden ratio constant φ ≈ 1.618. In this paper, we introduce a further generalization by
defining, for all ρ ≥ 1, Φd,ρ to be the unique positive root of the equation ρ(x + 1)d = xd+1.
Also, we shall make use of (the principal real branch of) the classical function known as the
Lambert-W function [16]: for τ ≥ 0, W (τ) is defined to be the unique solution to the equation
x · ex = τ .
A polynomial7 (weighted) congestion game of degree d, with d a positive integer, is a tuple
Γ = (N,E, (wu)u∈N , (Su)u∈N , (ce)e∈E). Here, N a (finite) set of |N | = n players and E is a
finite set of resources. Each resource e ∈ E has a polynomial cost function ce ∈ Pd. Every
player u ∈ N has a set of strategies Su ⊆ 2E and each vector s ∈ S := ×u∈NSu will be called a
state (or strategy profile) of the game Γ. Following standard game-theoretic notation, for any
s ∈ S and u ∈ N , we denote by s−u the profile of strategies of all players if we remove the
strategy su of player u; in this way, we have s = (su, s−u). Finally, each player u ∈ N has a
real positive weight wu > 0. However, we may henceforth assume that wu ≥ 1 for all u ∈ N , as
we can without loss of generality appropriately scale player weights and cost functions, without
affecting our results in this paper.
Given s ∈ S, we let xe(s) :=
∑
u:e∈su we denote the total weight of players using resource
e in state s. Generalizing this definition to any group of players R ⊆ N , we let xR, e(s) :=∑
u∈R:e∈su we. The cost of a player u at state s is defined as
Cu(s) := wu
∑
e∈su
ce(xe(s)).
Players are selfish and rational, and thus choose strategies as to minimize their own cost. Let
BRu(s) = BRu(s−u) be a best-response strategy of player u to the strategies s−u of the other
players, that is, BRu(s) ∈ argmins′u∈Su Cu(s−u, s′u) (in case of ties, we make an arbitrary selec-
tion). A state s of the game is a (pure Nash) equilibrium, if all players are already playing best-
5The fact that the worst-case PoA can be realized at such simple singleton games should come as no surprise,
due to the work of Bilò and Vinci [6, Theorem 1]. Our contribution here lies in determining the actual value of
the PoA.
6Formally, Pd = {f : R −→ R | f(x) =
∑d
i=0
aix
i, where ai ∈ R≥0 for all i}.
7We shall usually omit the word “polynomial” and refer to these games as weighted congestion games of degree
d, or simply as congestion games, when this causes no confusion.
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responses, that is, no player can unilaterally improve her costs; formally, Cu(s) ≤ Cu(s′u, s−u)
for all u ∈ N and s′u ∈ Su.
For a real parameter ρ ≥ 1, a unilateral deviation of player u to strategy s′u from state s
is called a ρ-move if Cu(s) > ρ · Cu(s−u, s′u). Extending the notion of an equilibrium in two
directions, we call a state s a ρ-approximate equilibrium (or simply a ρ-equilibrium) for a given
group of players R ⊆ N , if none of the players in R has a ρ-move; formally, Cu(s) ≤ ρCu(s′u, s−u)
for all u ∈ R and s′u ∈ Su. If this holds for R = N , then we simply refer to s as a ρ-equilibrium
of our game. We use QΓρ to denote the set of all ρ-equilibria of game Γ.
Ideally, our objective is to find states that induce low total cost in our game; we capture
this notion by defining the social cost C(s) of a state s to be the sum of the players’ costs, i.e.,
C(s) :=
∑
u∈N Cu(s). Extending this to any subset of players R ⊆ N , we also denote
CR(s) :=
∑
u∈R
Cu(s) =
∑
u∈R
wu
∑
e∈su
ce(xe(s)) =
∑
e∈E
xR, e(s)ce(xe(s)).
Clearly, CN (s) = C(s).
The standard way to quantify the inefficiency due to selfish behaviour, is to study the
worst-case ratio between any equilibrium and the optimal solution, quantified by the notion
of the Price of Anarchy (PoA). Formally, given a game Γ and a parameter ρ ≥ 1, the PoA of
ρ-equilibria (or simply the ρ-PoA) of Γ is PoA(Γ) := max
s∈QΓρ
C(s)
C(s∗) , where s
∗ ∈ argmin
s
C(s).
Finally, taking the worst case over all polynomial congestion games of degree d, we can define
the ρ-PoA of degree d as
PoAd(ρ) := sup
Γ
PoA(Γ) = sup
Γ
max
s∈QΓρ
C(s)
C(s∗)
.
3 The Price of Anarchy
In this section we present our tight bound on the PoA of ρ-approximate equilibria for (weighted)
congestion games. We first extend the smoothness method of Aland et al. [2] to obtain the up-
per bound on the PoA (Theorem 1), and then explicitly construct an example that extends a
result of Gairing and Schoppmann [22] and provides the matching lower bound on the PoA
(Theorem 2). We note here that there is a specific reason that this section precedes Section 4,
where our algorithm for computing approximate pure Nash equilibria is presented. The esti-
mation of the approximation guarantee of the algorithm requires the use of the closed-form
bound on the PoAd(ρ) we provide in Theorem 1 and, furthermore, the “Key Property” of our
algorithm (Theorem 3) rests critically on an application of Lemma 1 below.
3.1 Upper Bound
We formulate our upper bound on the PoA as the following theorem:
Theorem 1. The Price of Anarchy of ρ-approximate equilibria in (weighted) polynomial con-
gestion games of degree d, is at most Φd+1d,ρ , where Φd,ρ is the unique positive root of the equation
ρ(x+ 1)d = xd+1. In particular,
PoAd(ρ) ≤
[
d
W (d/ρ)
]d+1
,
where W (·) denotes the Lambert-W function.
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Theorem 1 is a direct consequence of the following Lemma 1, applied with R = N , and
Lemma 3. The reason we are proving a more general version of Lemma 1 than what’s needed
for just establishing our PoA upper bound of Theorem 1, is that we will actually need it for the
analysis of our main algorithm in Section 4.3.
Lemma 1. For any group of players R ⊆ N , let s and s∗ be states such that s is a ρ-equilibrium
for group R and every player in N \R uses the same strategy in both s and s∗. Then, the social
cost ratio of the two states is bounded by CR(s)CR(s∗) ≤ Φ
d+1
d,ρ .
The proof of Lemma 1 will essentially follow the smoothness technique [35] (see, e.g., [36,
Theorem 14.6]). However, special care still needs to be taken related to the fact that only a
subset R of players is deviating between the two states s and s∗. In particular, the key step
in the smoothness derivation is captured by the following lemma (proved in Appendix A) that
quantifies the PoA bound:
Lemma 2. For any constant ρ ≥ 1 and positive integer d,
B := inf
λ∈R
µ∈(0, 1
ρ
)
{
λρ
1− µρ
∣∣∣∣∀x, y, z ≥ 0, f ∈ Pd : yf(z + x+ y) ≤ λyf(z + y) + µxf(z + x)
}
= Φd+1d,ρ .
The constraint that Lemma 2 imposes on parameters λ and µ is slightly more general than
the analogous lemma in the smoothness derivation of Aland et al. [2]; namely, our condition con-
tains an extra variable z. This is a consequence of exactly the aforementioned fact that Lemma 2
is tailored to upper bounding a generalization of the PoA for groups of players.
Proof of Lemma 1. Assume that λ ∈ R and µ ∈ (0, 1ρ) are parameters such that, for any poly-
nomial f of degree d with nonnegative coefficients and for any x, y, z ≥ 0, it is
yf(z + x+ y) ≤ λyf(z + y) + µxf(z + x).
Applying this for the cost function ce(·) of any resource e, and replacing x ← xR, e(s), y ←
xR, e(s∗), and z ← xN\R, e(s) = xN\R, e(s∗) (the last equality holding due to the fact that every
player in N \R uses the same strategy in s and s∗) we have that
xR, e(s∗) ce(xe(s) + xR, e(s∗)) ≤ λxR, e(s∗) ce(xe(s∗)) + µxR, e(s) ce(xe(s)). (1)
Here we also used that z+x+y = xe(s)+xR, e(s∗), z+y = xe(s∗), and z+x = xe(s). Summing
(1) over all resources e, we obtain the following inequality:∑
e∈E
xR, e(s∗) ce(xe(s) + xR, e(s∗)) ≤ λCR(s∗) + µCR(s). (2)
Next, using the fact that s is a ρ-equilibrium we can upper-bound the social cost of the
players in R by
CR(s) =
∑
u∈R
Cu(s) ≤ ρ
∑
u∈R
Cu(s−u, s∗u) = ρ
∑
u∈R
wu
∑
e∈s∗u
ce(xe(s−u, s∗u)). (3)
Now, observe that for any player u ∈ R and any resource e ∈ s∗u that player u uses in profile s∗,
it is
xe(s−u, s∗u) ≤ xe(s) +wu ≤ xe(s) + xR, e(s∗).
The first inequality holds because player u is the only one deviating between states s and
(s−u, s∗u), while the second one because u definitely uses resource e in profile s
∗. Using the above,
due to the monotonicity of the cost functions ce, the bound in (3) can be further developed to
give us
CR(s) ≤ ρ
∑
u∈R
wu
∑
e∈s∗u
ce(xe(s) + xR, e(s∗)) = ρ
∑
e∈E
xR, e(s∗) ce(xe(s) + xR, e(s∗))
and thus, deploying the bound from (2), we finally arrive at
CR(s) ≤ ρλCR(s∗) + ρµCR(s),
which is equivalent to
CR(s)
CR(s∗)
≤ λρ
1− µρ.
Taking the infimum of the right-hand side, over the set of all feasible parameters λ ∈ R and
µ ∈ (0, 1ρ), Lemma 2 gives us desired upper bound of CR(s)CR(s∗) ≤ Φ
d+1
d,ρ .
We conclude this section by presenting the following useful bound on the generalized golden
ratio Φd,ρ, which is used in Theorem 1 to get the corresponding analytic expression for our
PoA bound. As discussed in the introduction of the current section, we will use it in the proof
of Theorem 6 in Section 4, for deriving the improved approximation guarantee of our algorithm.
Lemma 3. For any ρ ≥ 1 and any positive integer d,
Φd,ρ ≤ dW (d/ρ) ,
where W (·) is the Lambert-W function.
Proof. Recall that Φd,ρ is the solution of equation ρ(x+ 1)d = xd+1, which can be rewritten as
d(x+ 1)d
xd+1
=
d
ρ
.
By the proof of Lemma 11 (see function h), this equation has a unique positive root and the left
side is monotonically decreasing as a function of x; thus, to conclude the proof of our lemma,
it suffices to prove that
d(x˜+ 1)d
x˜d+1
≤ d
ρ
for x˜ :=
d
W
(
d
ρ
) . (4)
Indeed, substituting for convenience y˜ := dx˜ =W
(
d
ρ
)
, we have that
d(x˜+ 1)d
x˜d+1
= y˜
(
1 +
y˜
d
)d
= y˜
[(
1 +
y˜
d
) d
y˜
]y˜
≤ y˜ey˜ =W
(
d
ρ
)
e
W
(
d
ρ
)
=
d
ρ
.
For the inequality we used the fact that
(
1 + 1t
)t
< e for all t > 0. The last equality is a direct
consequence of the definition of the Lambert-W function.
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3.2 Lower Bound
To prove a matching PoA lower bound to the upper bound of Section 3.1, we consider a simple
instance involving n players and n + 1 resources. Each player has just 2 strategies, and each
strategy consists of a single resource; letting n → ∞, we obtain the desired lower bound of
Φd+1d,ρ . This bound extends smoothly the lower bound of Φ
d+1
d for the PoA of exact (ρ = 1)
equilibria by Gairing and Schoppmann [22, Theorem 4]. We also want to mention here that
the construction used in the proof of Theorem 2 below can be extended to apply to network
congestion games (see, e.g., [12, Proposition 3.4]).
Theorem 2. Let d be a positive integer and ρ ≥ 1. For every ε > 0, there exists a (singleton8)
weighted polynomial congestion game of degree d, whose ρ-approximate PoA is at least Φd+1d,ρ −ε,
where Φd,ρ is the unique positive root of the equation ρ(x+ 1)d = xd+1.
Proof. Consider the following congestion game, with n players N = {1, . . . , n} and n + 1 re-
sources E = {1, . . . , n+ 1}. Each player i has a weight of wi = wi, where w := 1Φd,ρ . Resources
have cost functions
cj(t) =


1
ρΦ
d+2
d,ρ , j = 1,
Φ(d+1)jd,ρ t
d, j = 2, . . . , n+ 1.
Each player i has only two available strategies, denoted by s∗i and si: either use only resource
i, or only resource i + 1. Formally, Si = {s∗i , si}, where s∗i = {i} and si = {i + 1}. The social
cost of profile s = (s1, . . . , sn), where every player i uses the (i+ 1)-th resource, is
C(s) =
n∑
i=1
Ci(s) =
n∑
i=1
wici+1(wi)
=
n∑
i=1
wiΦ(d+1)(i+1)d,ρ w
id =
n∑
i=1
(
Φi+1d,ρ w
i
)d+1
=
n∑
i=1
Φd+1d,ρ = nΦ
d+1
d,ρ .
while that of s∗ = (s∗1, . . . , s
∗
n), where player i uses the i-th resource is
C(s∗) =
n∑
i=1
wici(wi) = w
1
ρ
Φd+2d,ρ +
n∑
i=2
wiΦ(d+1)id,ρ w
id =
1
ρ
Φd+1d,ρ +
n∑
i=2
1 =
1
ρ
Φd+1d,ρ + n− 1.
We now claim that profile s is a ρ-equilibrium. Indeed, for player i = 1,
C1(s)
C1(s−1, s∗1)
=
c2(w1)
c1(w1)
=
Φ2(d+1)d,ρ w
d
1
ρΦ
d+2
d,ρ
= ρ
Φ2(d+1)−dd,ρ
Φd+2d,ρ
= ρ,
and for all players i = 2, . . . , n,
Ci(s)
Ci(s−ui , s
∗
i )
=
ci+1(wi)
ci(wi + wi−1)
=
Φ(d+1)(i+1)d,ρ (w
i)d
Φ(d+1)id,ρ (w
i +wi−1)d
= Φd+1d,ρ
(
1 +
1
w
)−d
= Φd+1d,ρ (Φd,ρ+1)
−d = ρ,
the last equality coming for the definition of the generalized golden ratio Φd,ρ; thus, no player
can unilaterally deviate from s and gain (strictly) more than a factor of ρ.
8In singleton congestion games the strategies of all players consist of a single resource. Formally |su| = 1, for
any u ∈ N and all su ∈ Su.
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Since s is a ρ-equilibrium, the ρ-PoA of our game is at least
C(s)
mins′ C(s′)
≥ C(s)
C(s∗)
=
nΦd+1d,ρ
n− 1 + 1ρΦd+1d,ρ
→ Φd+1d,ρ ,
as n grows arbitrarily large. This concludes our proof.
4 The Algorithm
In this section we describe and study our algorithm for computing dd+o(d)-approximate equilibria
in weighted congestion games of degree d. The algorithm, as well as the general outline of its
analysis, are inspired by the work of Caragiannis et al. [8]. However, as discussed in Section 1.2,
here we are using the approximate potential function of Christodoulou et al. [13]. This will
be crucial in proving that the algorithm is indeed poly-time and, more importantly, has the
improved approximation guarantee of dd+o(d).
In Section 4.1, we introduce the aforementioned potential function from [13], along with some
natural extensions that will be useful for our analysis — partial and subgame potentials. This is
complemented by a set of technical lemmas through which our use of this potential function will
be instantiated in the rest of the paper. In Section 4.2, we describe our approximation algorithm
and next, in Section 4.3, we show that it indeed runs in polynomial time; the critical step in
achieving this is proving the “Key Property” (Theorem 3) of our algorithm, which appropriately
bounds the potential of certain groups of players throughout its execution. Finally, in Section 4.4
we establish the desired approximation guarantee of the algorithm.
4.1 The Potential Function Technique
Our subsequent proofs regarding both the runtime and the approximation guarantee of our al-
gorithm, will rely heavily on the use of an approximate potential function. In particular, we will
use a straightforward variant of the Faulhaber potential function, introduced by Christodoulou
et al. [13]. Consider a polynomial weighted congestion game of degree d. For every resource e
with cost function ce(x) =
∑d
ν=0 ae,νx
ν , we set
φe(x) := ae,0 x+
d∑
ν=1
ae,ν
(
xν+1 +
ν + 1
2
xν
)
. (5)
The potential of any state s of the game is then defined as
Φ(s) :=
∑
e∈E
φe(xe(s)).
The potential function introduced above satisfies a crucial property which is given in the
following lemma and which will be extensively used in the rest of our paper. To state it, we will
first define9 an auxiliary constant
α := d+ 1. (6)
Lemma 4. For any resource e, x ≥ 0 and w ≥ 1:
w · ce(x+ w) ≤ φe(x+w) − φe(x) ≤ α · w · ce(x+ w),
where function φe is defined given in (5) and parameter α in (6).
9The reason for introducing extra notation here, and not making the arguably simpler choice to directly use
the actual value of d+ 1 instead of variable α, for the rest of the paper, is that we want to assist readability: by
using α, we make clear where exactly this factor from our approximate potential comes into play.
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Proof. From the proof10 of Theorem 4.4 of Christodoulou et al. [12] we know that, if for resource
e with cost function ce(x) =
∑d
ν=0 ae,νx
ν we define
φˆe(x) =
d∑
ν=1
ae,νSν(x), where Sν(x) =
{
xν+1
ν+1 +
xν
2 , ν = 1, . . . , d,
x, ν = 0,
(7)
then
1
d+ 1
· w · ce(x+ w) ≤ φˆe(x+ w)− φˆe(x) ≤ w · ce(x+ w).
We now multiply each ν-th term of the sum for φˆe(x) in (7) by ν + 1, defining
φe(x) =
d∑
ν=1
ae,ν(ν + 1)Sν(x)
which coincides with our definition of the potential in (5). It is not difficult to see (by following
the same proof of [12, Thereom 4.4]) that the above translates into essentially scaling the entire
potential by d+ 1, resulting in the desired bound in the statement of Lemma 4.
The notions of partial and subgame potential were introduced in [8], and we now adapt
them for the setting of our new approximate potential. The subgame potential with respect to
a group of players R ⊆ N of a state s is defined as:
ΦR(s) :=
∑
e∈E
φe(xR, e(s)).
The partial potential with respect to a group of players R ⊆ N is then defined as:
ΦR(s) := Φ(s)− ΦN\R(s) =
∑
e∈E
[
φe(xe(s))− φe(xN\R, e(s))
]
. (8)
In the original work by Christodoulou et al. [13], the variable w in Lemma 4 was interpreted
as a single player’s weight, and x as the total remaining weight on resource e. In our analysis,
however, x and w will each play the role of the total weight of some group’s players who are
using resource e. Lemma 4 then becomes a very powerful algebraic tool that relates social cost
of groups of players and partial potentials in a variety of settings, and plays an important role
in many of our proofs. In many cases, it will be present in such proofs implicitly, through the
following corollary (Lemma 5), which says that the chosen potential function is cost-revealing
in a strong sense. That is, for any group of players, the ratio of the partial potential and the
social cost of that group is bounded from both above and below.
Lemma 5. For any group of players R ⊆ N ,∑
u∈R
Cu(s) ≤ ΦR(s) ≤ α
∑
u∈R
Cu(s).
Proof. First consider each resource e separately. Setting x = xN\R, e(s) and w = xR, e(s) in
Lemma 4, we obtain
xR, e(s) · ce(xN\R, e(s) + xR, e(s)) ≤ φe(xN\R, e(s) + xR, e(s)) − φe(xN\R, e(s))
≤ α · xR, e(s) · ce(xN\R, e(s) + xR, e(s)).
10In particular, see Eq. (4.10) in the proof of [12, Claim 4.7] and the related [12, Lemma 4.3], both applied for
the special case of γ = 1 here.
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Summing over all resources, we get that∑
u∈R
Cu(s) ≤ Φ(s)− ΦN\R(s) ≤ α
∑
u∈R
Cu(s).
By definition (8), ΦR(s) = Φ(s)− ΦN\R(s), concluding the proof.
The following lemma provides a relation between the change in potential due to a single
player’s deviation and a linear combination of that player’s old and new costs. For an exact
potential function, the latter would simply be the difference in the cost experienced by that
player. However, in our case, the player’s cost in one of the two states is weighted by an
additional factor of α compared to her cost in the other state. Thus, Lemma 6 only implies a
decrease in the potential function if the deviating player has improved her cost by at least a
factor α.
Lemma 6. Let u be a player, R be an arbitrary subset of players with u ∈ R, and s and s′ be
two states that differ only in the strategy of player u. Then,
ΦR(s)− ΦR(s′) ≥ Cu(s) − αCu(s′).
Proof. First observe that, since each player in N \R plays the same strategy in both profiles s
and s′, it must be that xN\R, e(s) = xN\R, e(s′). Using this, we can derive that
ΦN\R(s) =
∑
e∈E
φe(xN\R, e(s)) =
∑
e∈E
φe(xN\R, e(s
′)) = ΦN\R(s′),
and thus
ΦR(s)− ΦR(s′) =
[
Φ(s)− ΦN\R(s)
]
−
[
Φ(s′)− ΦN\R(s′)
]
= Φ(s)− Φ(s′),
where the first equality is due to the definition of partial potentials (8).
Finally, due to Lemma 4 (via Lemma 4.1 of Christodoulou et al. [12]) we know that Φ is
indeed an α-approximate potential, that is,
Φ(s)− Φ(s′) ≥ Cu(s) − αCu(s′)
given that s and s′ differ only on the strategy of player u.
4.2 Description of the Algorithm
We shall now describe our algorithm for finding dd+o(d)-approximate equilibria in weighted
congestion games of degree d (see Algorithm 1). We remark, once again, that it is inspired
by a similar algorithm by Caragiannis et al. [8]. However, a critical difference is that our
algorithm runs directly in the actual game (using the original cost functions, and thus, players’
deviations that are best-responses with respect to the actual game); as a result, we also need
to appropriately calibrate the original parameters from Caragiannis et al. [8]. First, we fix the
following constant that essentially captures our target approximation factor :
p := (2d+ 3)(d + 1)(4d)d+1 = dd+o(d). (9)
The following lemma captures a critical property of the above parameter, which is the one that
will essentially give rise to the specific approximation factor of our algorithm (see Theorem 6).
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Algorithm 1 Computing dd+o(d)-approximate equilibria in weighted polynomial congestion
games of degree d
INPUT: A polynomial weighted congestion game Γ of degree d; A state sinit of Γ
OUTPUT: A dd+o(d)-equilibrium state s
1: cmax ← maxu∈N Cu(sinit), cmin ← minu∈N Cu(0−u,BRu(0)), m← log cmaxcmin
2: g ← np3(1 +m(1 + p))ddd + 1 ⊲ p is defined in (9)
3: bi ← g−icmax for all i = 1, . . . ,m
4: s ← sinit
5: Nfixed ← ∅
6: while ∃u ∈ N : Cu(s) ≥ b1 ∧ u has an (α+ 1p)-move do
7: s ← (s−u,BRu(s))
8: for i = 1 to m− 1 do
9: while ∃u ∈ N \Nfixed :[
Cu(s) ∈ [bi+1, bi) ∧ u has an (α+ 1p)-move
]∨ [
Cu(s) ≥ bi ∧ u has a p-move
]
do
10: s ← (s−u,BRu(s))
11: Nfixed ← Nfixed ∪ {u ∈ N \Nfixed : Cu(s) ≥ bi}
12: Nfixed ← Nfixed ∪ {u ∈ N \Nfixed : Cu(s) ≥ bm}
Lemma 7. For any positive integer d, the parameter p defined in (9) satisfies the following
property:
p ≥ (2α+ 1)α · PoAd
(
α+
1
p
)
= (2α + 1)αΦd+1
d,α+ 1
p
where α is given in (6).
Proof. First, recall from (6) that α = d + 1. Next, we note that the Lambert-W function is
increasing on the positive reals (see Corless et al. [16]) and so, for any d ≥ 1,
W
(
d
d+ 2
)
≥ W
(
1
3
)
≈ 0.258 > 1
4
.
Furthermore, the ρ-approximate Price of Anarchy PoAd(ρ) is also nondecreasing with respect
to the approximation parameter ρ ≥ 1 (since the set of allowable approximate equilibria gets
larger; see Section 2). Thus, from Theorem 1 we can see that
PoAd
(
α+
1
p
)
≤ PoAd (d+ 2) ≤

 d
W
(
d
d+2
)


d+1
≤ (4d)d+1.
From this, we can finally get that indeed
(2d+ 3)(d + 1)PoAd
(
α+
1
p
)
≤ (2d+ 3)(d + 1)(4d)d+1 = p.
The equality in the statement of our lemma is just a consequence of the fact that the ρ-PoA is
exactly equal to Φd+1d,ρ (from Section 3; see Theorem 1 and Theorem 2).
The input to the algorithm consists of the description of a weighted polynomial conges-
tion game Γ of fixed degree d and an (arbitrary) initial state sinit of Γ. We now let cmax :=
maxu∈N Cu(sinit) and cmin := minu∈N Cu(0−u,BRu(0)). Here, 0 denotes the “empty state”,
that is, a fictitious state in which all players’ strategies are empty sets. Recall also (see Section 2)
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that BRu(·) returns a best-response move of player u at a given state. Observe that cmax is
the maximum cost of a player in state sinit, and cmin can be used as a lower bound on the cost
of any player in any state of our game. We also define parameter m = log cmaxcmin . Notice that
m is polynomial on the input (that is, the description of our game Γ). Next, we introduce a
factor g (see Line 2 of Algorithm 1), that depends (polynomially) on both the aforementioned
parameter m of our game and the approximation factor p. Using this, we set m+1 “boundaries”
cmax = b0, b1, . . . , bm so that bi = g−icmax for the player costs (see discussion below).
The algorithm runs in m phases, indexed by i = 0, 1, . . . ,m − 1. It is helpful to introduce
here the following notation. We denote by si the state of the game immediately after the end
of phase i. Furthermore, let Ri be the set of players who were at least once selected by the
algorithm to make an improvement move during phase i.
Phase i = 0 is “preparatory”: we repeatedly select a player whose cost exceeds the largest
(non-trivial) boundary b1 and who has an (α+p−1)-move, and allow her to make a best-response
move. This phase ends when there are no such players left.
Next follow the “main”m−1 phases. The algorithm constructs the final state sm−1, which is
the sought dd+o(d)-approximate equilibrium, step by step. That is, it finalizes players’ strategies
in “packets” rather than one-by-one. In particular, during each phase it fixes the strategies of
a certain group of players, and never changes them again.
The i-th phase itself, consists of a sequence of best-responses. We allow players (who are not
“fixed” yet) to repeatedly make best-response moves, according to a certain rule: if a player’s
current cost is “large”, i.e. lies in [bi,∞), she is allowed to best-respond only if she can improve
at least by a factor of p (that is, she has a p-move); if, however, her cost is “small”, i.e. in
[bi+1, bi), she can play even if she only has an (α+p−1)-move.11 The phase ends when there are
no players left to make a deviation according to the above rule. At this point, the algorithm
fixes the strategies of all players whose current cost lies in [bi,∞), and adds them to the set
Nfixed.
Immediately after the end of phase m − 1, the algorithm returns the current state of the
game and terminates. Observe that after the final phase of the algorithm, all players have
been included in Nfixed: using the definitions of m and bm, it is not difficult to see that that
bm ≤ cmin.
4.3 Running Time
In this section, we prove the “Key Property” of our algorithm (Theorem 3), and then estab-
lish Theorem 4 which guarantees that the runtime of the algorithm is polynomial. We remark
here that we assume, for the runtime analysis, that best-response strategies are efficiently com-
putable.12 One should also keep in mind that the degree d of the game is considered a constant.
However, with respect to the analysis of the approximation guarantee of the algorithm (see
the following Section 4.4), it will actually be treated as a parameter: the approximation factor
will be given as a function of d. We want to emphasize here that all these assumptions are
standard in the literature of algorithms for approximate equilibria in congestion games (see e.g.
[7, 8, 20, 19]).
11One can think of this second type of moves as “preparatory” for the next phase. Indeed, they ensure that
immediately before the beginning of the (i+ 1)-th phase, players who are not yet fixed and whose costs exceed
bi+1 are in an (α + p
−1)-equilibrium. We can expect such players to perform relatively few p-moves during the
(i+ 1)-th phase, since the approximation factor α+ p−1 is significantly smaller than p (see (9)).
12Formally, we want function BRu(s−u) to be computable in polynomial time, for any player u and any
strategies s−u of the other players. This assumption is necessary in general, since the number of strategies of a
player can, in principle, be exponential in the input size. Think, for example, of source-sink paths in network
congestion games. Of course, if the strategy sets of the players have polynomial size in the first place, then the
time-efficiency of best-responses comes for free anyway.
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Recall that Ri is the set of players that made at least one improvement move during the i-th
phase of the algorithm. In the following it will be useful to denote by Cu(i), for any u ∈ Ri,
the cost of player u immediately after her last move within phase i. Then we can prove the
following upper bound on the partial potential of Ri immediately after phase i:
Lemma 8. For every phase i, ΦRi(s
i) ≤ α∑u∈Ri Cu(i).
Proof. Rename players in Ri as u1, ..., u|Ri| in increasing order of time of their last move during
phase i. Call si,j the state immediately after player uj made her last move during phase i.
Define Rji := {uj+1, ..., u|Ri|}, the set of players who moved during phase i after state si,j.
Then, using the definition of the partial potential (8), we can obtain the telescoping sum
ΦRi(s
i) = Φ(si)− ΦN\Ri(si) =
|Ri|∑
j=1
[
ΦN\R
j
i (si)− ΦN\Rj−1i (si)
]
(10)
We now consider each term of the above sum separately. For any j = 1, . . . , |Ri| and any
resource e, we have x
N\Rj
i
, e
(si,j) = x
N\Rj
i
, e
(si) and x
N\Rj−1
i
, e
(si,j) = x
N\Rj−1
i
, e
(si). Indeed,
only players in Rji made moves between state s
i,j and the end of phase i, and consequently,
players in N \ Rji and in N \ Rj−1i ⊆ N \Rji never changed their strategies between states si,j
and si. Thus,
ΦN\R
j
i (si)− ΦN\Rj−1i (si) =
∑
e∈E
[
φe(xN\Rj
i
, e
(si))− φe(xN\Rj−1
i
, e
(si))
]
=
∑
e∈E
[
φe(xN\Rj
i
, e
(si,j))− φe(xN\Rj−1
i
, e
(si,j))
]
At this point, we use that N\Rji = (N\Rj−1i )∪{uj}, paired with Lemma 4 and the monotonicity
of ce, to further obtain
ΦN\R
j
i (si)− ΦN\Rj−1i (si) =
∑
e∈E
[
φe(xN\Rj−1
i
, e
(si,j) + xuj , e(s
i,j))− φe(xN\Rj−1
i
, e
(si,j))
]
≤
∑
e∈E
αxuj , e(s
i,j) · ce(xN\Rj−1
i
, e
(si,j) + xuj , e(s
i,j))
≤ α
∑
e∈E
xuj , e(s
i,j) · ce(xe(si,j))
= αCuj (s
i,j).
Applying this bound to each term in the sum in (10), we finally get the desired inequality
ΦRi(s
i) ≤
|Ri|∑
j=1
αCuj(s
i,j) = α
∑
u∈Ri
Cu(i),
where for the last equality we used the definition of Cu(i).
The following result is necessary to prove Theorem 3 and is essentially the cornerstone of
the approach to computing approximate equilibria that our algorithm takes. Namely, Lemma 9
considers a group of players in an approximate equilibrium at some state s and shows that the
potential of s is at most a fixed factor away from the potential of any other state that only
differs from s in the strategies of players in that group. In particular, this factor turns out to
be of the order of the ρ-PoA (see also Theorem 1).
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Lemma 9. For any group of players R ⊆ N , consider any two states s and s′ such that s is a
ρ-equilibrium state for the players in R and every player in N \ R uses the same strategy in s
and s′. Then ΦR(s) ≤ αΦd+1d,ρ ΦR(s′).
Proof. Utilizing Lemma 5 we can bound the ratio of the partial potentials by
ΦR(s)
ΦR(s
′)
≤ α
∑
u∈R Cu(s)∑
u∈R Cu(s′)
≤ αΦd+1d,ρ ,
where the last inequality holds from by Lemma 1.
Finally, the following theorem establishes that the partial potential of the players Ri, who
are going to move during the i-th phase, is linearly-bounded by the i-th cost boundary bi at
the beginning of that phase. This result will be used in two ways: on one hand, it is the basis
of the proof of Theorem 4, which guarantees polynomial runtime of the algorithm; on the other
hand, Theorem 3 will be used in Section 4.4 as well, to bound the approximation factor of the
algorithm (Theorem 5 in particular).
Theorem 3 (Key Property). For every phase i ≥ 1 of the algorithm, ΦRi(si−1) ≤ npbi.
Proof. We split Ri = Pi ∪Qi, where Pi are players in Ri whose last move during phase i was a
p-move, and Qi those whose last move during phase i was an (α+p−1)-move. Now suppose there
were τ best-response moves executed during the course of phase i (see Line 10 in Algorithm 1),
and denote the corresponding states in the game by si−1 = t0, t1, . . . , tτ = si. Then
ΦRi(s
i−1)− ΦRi(si) =
τ∑
j=1
[
ΦRi(tj−1)− ΦRi(tj)
]
. (11)
Notice here that, due to Lemma 6 and the fact that p, α + p−1 > α, i.e., all best-responses in
the above sum are better than α-moves, all terms of the above sum are positive. Thus, keeping
only those terms j for which tj−1 → tj corresponds to the last move during phase i of some
player in Pi, we get that
ΦRi(s
i−1)− ΦRi(si) ≥
∑
u∈Pi
(p− α)Cu(i), (12)
where recall that Cu(i) denotes the cost of player u after her last move within phase i.
By Lemma 8, we also have that
∑
u∈Pi
Cu(i) =
∑
u∈Ri
Cu(i)−
∑
u∈Qi
Cu(i) ≥ 1
α
ΦRi(s
i)−
∑
u∈Qi
Cu(i) ≥ 1
α
ΦRi(s
i)− nbi,
the last inequality holding due to the fact that all players in Qi have cost at most bi at the end
of phase i. Combining this with (12), and solving with respect to ΦRi(s
i), we finally get that
ΦRi(s
i) ≤ α
p
[
ΦRi(s
i−1) + (p − α)nbi
]
≤ α
p
[
ΦRi(s
i−1) + pnbi
]
.
To arrive at a contradiction, and complete the proof of our theorem, from now on assume that
ΦRi(s
i−1) > nbip. Then, the above inequality becomes
ΦRi(s
i) <
2α
p
ΦRi(s
i−1). (13)
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We now introduce some additional notation for the current proof. First, partition Ri into
Xi and Yi, where Xi contains the players in Ri whose cost is at least bi at state si−1, and Yi
those whose cost is strictly less than bi. Secondly, consider a helper game13 Γ¯ with the same
set of players N¯ = N and resources E¯ = E ∪{eu : u ∈ Yi}. The new, extra resources have costs
c¯eu(t) =
bi
wu
for all u ∈ Yi,
while the old ones have the same costs c¯e(t) = ce(t) for all e ∈ E. All players in N \ Yi, have
the same strategies in Γ¯ as before in Γ. However, for the rest we set
S¯u = {su} ∪
{
s′u ∪ {eu}
∣∣ s′u ∈ Su \ {su}} for all u ∈ Yi,
where su is the strategy that u uses in state si−1 of the original game Γ. Denote the potential
in Γ′ by Φ¯.
We define two special strategy profiles, namely s¯i−1 and s¯i, of our new game Γ¯. In state
s¯i−1, every player uses the same strategy as in state si−1 of the original game Γ. In state s¯i,
again players use the same strategies as in state si of Γ, except from those players in Yi that
happen to have different strategies between si−1 and si. In particular, if a player u ∈ Yi uses
strategy su under profile si−1 and strategy s′u 6= su at profile si, then we set her strategy at s¯i
to be s′u ∪ {eu}.
Then, one can show (see Appendix B) the following about these states: first, s¯i−1 is an
(α+ p−1)-equilibrium (of game Γ¯) for all players in Ri; and secondly,
Φ¯Ri(s¯
i) ≤ ΦRi(si) + nbi.
Using (13) and recalling our assumption that ΦRi(s
i−1) > nbip, the above inequality gives us
that
Φ¯Ri(s¯
i) <
2α+ 1
p
ΦRi(s
i−1) =
2α+ 1
p
Φ¯Ri(s¯
i−1),
where the last equality is a result of the fact that all players use the same strategies in s¯i−1
and si−1, which consist only of edges that have exactly the same cost functions at Γ and Γ¯.
From Lemma 7, this becomes
Φ¯Ri(s¯
i−1) > αΦd+1
d,α+ 1
p
Φ¯Ri(s¯
i),
which contradicts Lemma 9, since all players in Ri are in an (α+ p−1)-equilibrium in s¯i−1, and
every player in N \Ri has uses the same strategy in s¯i−1 and s¯i. This contradiction concludes
our proof.
Now we are able to prove the main theorem of this section:
Theorem 4. Algorithm 1 runs in time polynomial in the number of bits of the representation
of its input game Γ.
Proof. It suffices to show that every phase i = 0, . . . ,m− 1 runs in poly-time, since the number
of phases m = log cmaxcmin is polynomial in the representation of the game.
First, fix such a phase i and suppose there were τ single-player best-response moves (see
Line 10 of Algorithm 1) during the course of this phase. For this proof only, set s−1 := sinit.
Denote all intermediate states that correspond to these deviations by si−1 = t0, t1, . . . , tτ = si
13This is exactly the same construction as in the proof of Caragiannis et al. [8, Lemma 4.3].
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in chronological order, and call uj the player who makes the best-response move corresponding
to the change from state tj−1 to tj. Then
Φ(si−1)− Φ(si) = ΦRi(si−1)− ΦRi(si) =
τ∑
j=1
[
ΦRi(tj−1)− ΦRi(tj)
]
. (14)
The first equality holds using the definition of the partial potential (8) and the fact that players
in N \Ri do not move during phase i, so ΦN\Ri(si−1) = ΦN\Ri(si). The second uses a telescoping
sum.
Now observe that during the phase, players selected to make a move either make an (α+p−1)-
move or a p-move (for the i = 0, only the former). Hence, for any intermediate state j, it must
be that
Cuj (tj−1) ≥ min{p, a+ p−1} · Cuj (tj) = (a+ p−1)Cuj (tj)
Applying Lemma 6, we then obtain
ΦRi(tj−1)− ΦRi(tj) ≥ Cuj(tj−1)−
α
α+ p−1
Cuj (tj−1) =
1
αp+ 1
Cuj(tj−1). (15)
By definition of the algorithm (see Algorithm 1), player uj has to have cost Cuj (tj−1) ≥ bi+1,
otherwise she wouldn’t have made any moves during phase i. Recalling that bi+1 = big−1,
inequality (15) now tells us that, for all j = 1, . . . , τ ,
ΦRi(tj−1)− ΦRi(tj) ≥
big
−1
αp + 1
and so applying (14) we get that
ΦRi(s
i−1)− ΦRi(si) ≥ τ
big
−1
αp+ 1
.
If i ≥ 1, this can be rewritten as
τ ≤ g(αp + 1)b−1i ·
[
ΦRi(s
i−1)− ΦRi(si)
]
≤ g(αp + 1) · b−1i ΦRi(si−1) ≤ n · g(αp + 1)p,
where the last inequality holds due to Theorem 3.
For the remaining, special case of i = 0, since b0 = cmax and s−1 = sinit, we similarly get
that
τ ≤ g(αp + 1) · c−1maxΦ(sinit) ≤ n · αg(αp + 1),
where the last inequality is a consequence of applying Lemma 5 (with s = sinit and R = N):
Φ(sinit) ≤ α
∑
u∈N
Cu(sinit) ≤ αncmax.
In any case, we showed that indeed τ is polynomially bounded in the size of the input.
4.4 Approximation Factor
In this section, we establish the desired approximation guarantee of our algorithm (Theorem 6).
Our high-level approach is to examine the amount by which the cost of a player can change after
she is “fixed” by the algorithm, and in particular, how the changes in other players’ strategies
during the following phases affect the beneficial deviating moves that she might have at the final
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state. We formalize this in Theorem 5, which is the backbone of proving Theorem 6, together
with the Key Property (Lemma 8) of the previous section.
The following theorem establishes two very important properties. First, after the strategy
of a player u becomes fixed, immediately after some phase j, and until the end of the algorithm
(phase sm−1), her cost will not increase by more than a small factor; and furthermore, no
deviation s′u of player u can be much more profitable at the end of the algorithm than it was
immediately after the fixing phase j:
Theorem 5. Suppose the strategy of player u was fixed at the end of phase j. Then,
Cu(s
m−1) ≤ (1 + 3p−1)Cu(sj) (16)
and
Cu(s
m−1
−u , s
′
u) ≥ (1− 2p−1)Cu(sj−u, s′u) for all s′u ∈ Su. (17)
To prove our theorem, we will need to capture the relation of the cost of player u between
state sj (when she was fixed) and sm−1 (end state of the algorithm), in a more refined way. In
particular, we want to see how the cost of player u can change during all intermediate phases
i = j + 1, . . . ,m− 1. This is exactly captured by the following lemma, proven in Appendix C:
Lemma 10. Fix any ε > 0 and let ξε :=
(
1 + 1ε
)d
dd. Consider any player u whose strategy
was fixed immediately after phase j. Then, for any phase i > j,
Cu(s
i) ≤ (1 + ε)Cu(si−1) + ξεΦRi(si−1) (18)
and
Cu(s
i
−u, s
′
u) ≥
1
1 + ε
Cu(s
i−1
−u , s
′
u)−
ξε
1 + ε
ΦRi(s
i−1) for all s′u ∈ Su. (19)
Lemma 10 states that the cost of player u cannot increase by too much during any phase
i > j and, at the same time, the cost player u would get by deviating cannot decrease by too
much during any phase i > j. We remark here that the upper bound provided by Lemma 10
will itself be bounded by the guarantee provided by Theorem 3. Now, by appropriately applying
Lemma 10 in an iterative way, we can prove our theorem:
Proof of Theorem 5. First, fix an ǫ > 0 such that
(1 + ε)m = 1 +
1
p
. (20)
Then, by Lemma 13 it must be that m(1+p) ≥ ε−1, and so for the parameter g of our algorithm
(see Line 2 of Algorithm 1) we have the bound
g − 1 = np3(1 +m(1 + p))ddd ≥ np3ξε, (21)
where ξε is defined as in Lemma 10.
Also, observe that, since j is the phase at which player u is fixed, it must be that
Cu(s
j) ≥ bj and Cu(sj) ≤ p · Cu(sj−u, s′u), (22)
for any deviation s′u ∈ Su of player u. These are both consequences of the definition of our
algorithm: the first inequality comes immediately from Line 11 of Algorithm 1, while the second
one is due to the fact that player u has no p-move left at the end of phase j (see Line 9 of
Algorithm 1).
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Next, for proving (16), apply (18) recursively, backwards for i = m−1, . . . , j+1, to get that
Cu(s
m−1) ≤ (1 + ε)m−1−jCu(sj) + ξε
m−1∑
i=j+1
(1 + ε)m−1−iΦRi(s
i−1)
≤ (1 + ε)m

Cu(sj) + ξε m−1∑
i=j+1
ΦRi(s
i−1)


= (1 + p−1)

Cu(sj) + ξε m−1∑
i=j+1
ΦRi(s
i−1)

 , (23)
where for the second inequality we have used the fact that m−1− j,m−1− i ≤ m, and for the
last equality we used (20). By using Theorem 3, we can now bound the second term of (23) by
ξε
m−1∑
i=j+1
ΦRi(s
i−1) ≤ ξεnp
m−1∑
i=j+1
bi = ξεnpbj
m−1−j∑
i=1
g−i ≤ ξεnp
g − 1bj ≤ p
−2bj ≤ p−2Cu(sj). (24)
where the last two inequalities are due to (21) and (22), respectively.
Combining (23) with (24), we finally get
Cu(s
m−1) ≤ (1 + p−1)(1 + p−2)Cu(sj) = (1 + p−1 + p−2 + p−3)Cu(sj),
which establishes (16).
Moving to (17) now, and applying (19) recursively, backwards for i = m− 1, . . . , j + 1, we
get that
Cu(s
m−1
−u , s
′
u) ≥ (1 + ε)j+1−mCu(sj−u, s′u)− ξε
m−1∑
i=j+1
(1 + ε)i−mΦRi(s
i−1)
≥ (1 + ε)−mCu(sj−u, s′u)− ξε
m−1∑
i=j+1
ΦRi(s
i−1)
= (1 + p−1)−1Cu(s
j
−u, s
′
u)− ξε
m−1∑
i=j+1
ΦRi(s
i−1), (25)
the second inequality coming from observing that j + 1 −m ≥ m, i −m ≤ 0 and the last one
by using (20). Using (24) and (22), we can bound the second term in (25) by
ξε
m−1∑
i=j+1
ΦRi(s
i−1) ≤ p−2Cu(sj) ≤ p−1Cu(sj−u, s′u),
and thus (25) finally becomes
Cu(s
m−1
−u , s
′
u) ≥
[
(1 + p−1)−1 − p−1
]
Cu(s
j
−u, s
′
u) ≥ (1− 2p−1)Cu(sj−u, s′u),
where for the last inequality we used the fact that, for any real x > 0, (1 + x)−1 ≥ 1− x. This
establishes (17), concluding the proof of the theorem.
We are now ready to prove the main theorem of this section:
Theorem 6. At the end of Algorithm 1, all players are in a dd+o(d)-equilibrium.
20
Proof. Consider an arbitrary player u and any strategy s′u she can deviate to from state s
m−1.
Suppose her strategy was fixed right after state sj . Then, by the definition of our algorithm
(see Algorithm 1), she has no p-move in state sj . Applying this along with Theorem 5, we see
that
Cu(s
m−1)
Cu(s
m−1
−u , s
′
u)
≤ 1 + 3p
−1
1− 2p−1
Cu(s
j)
Cu(s
j
−u, s
′
u)
≤ 1 + 3p
−1
1− 2p−1 · p = d
d+o(d),
where the last step holds due to (9) and observing that, since p ≥ 160 (by (9) and d ≥ 1), it
must be that 1+3p
−1
1−2p−1 ≤ 163/158 ≈ 1.032.
Acknowledgements We thank Martin Gairing and George Christodoulou for useful discus-
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Appendix
A Proof of Lemma 2
Our proof of Lemma 2 follows along the lines of Aland et al. [2, Section 5.3]. Still, care needs to
be taken in order to incorporate correctly the added approximation factor ρ and, to a smaller
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degree, parameter z that essentially corresponds to the deviations of subsets of players in our
upper bound result in Lemma 1.
We will first need a technical lemma, which is a straightforward generalization of [2, Lemma
5.2]:
Lemma 11. Fix any µ ≥ 0, ρ, d > 0 and define the function g(x) = ρ(x+1)d −µ · xd+1. Then
g has exactly one local maximum in R≥0. More precisely, there exists a unique ξ ∈ R≥0 such
that g is strictly increasing in [0, ξ) and strictly decreasing in (ξ,∞).
Proof. For the derivative of g we have that, for any x > 0:
g′(x) = 0 ⇐⇒ ρd(x+ 1)d−1 − µ(d+ 1)xd = 0 ⇐⇒ (x+ 1)
d−1
xd
=
µ(d+ 1)
ρd
. (26)
Now define the function h(x) = (x+1)
d−1
xd
and observe that h′(x) = − (x+1)d−2·(x+d)
xd+1
< 0 for all
x > 0. Additionally, limx→0+ h(x) = ∞ and limx→∞ h(x) = 0. Thus, since c := µ(d+1)ρd ≥ 0,
there exists a unique ξ ∈ [0,∞) such that h(ξ) = c; furthermore, h(x) > c for x ∈ [0, ξ) and
h(x) < c for x > ξ. Given the derivation in (26), this is enough to conclude the proof of the
lemma.
We are now ready to prove Lemma 2. First, examine the critical condition
y · f(z + x+ y) ≤ λy · f(z + y) + µx · f(z + x) ∀x, y, z ≥ 0, ∀f ∈ Pd
of the set whose infimum defines B in the statement of our lemma. Note that for any z ≥ 0, if we
define f¯(t) := f(z+ t) for all t ∈ R, then f¯ is again a polynomial with nonnegative coefficients.
Therefore, the condition above is equivalent to the simpler one:
y · f(x+ y) ≤ λy · f(y) + µx · f(x) ∀x, y, z ≥ 0, ∀f ∈ Pd.
From now on, performing a consecutive transformation of this condition in exactly the same
way as in the proof of [2, Lemma 5.5], we can eventually derive that
B = inf
λ∈R, µ∈(0, 1
ρ
)
{
λρ
1− µρ
∣∣∣∣ ∀x ≥ 0 : λ ≥ (x+ 1)d − µxd+1
}
.
Now, taking into consideration that ρ, 1 − µρ > 0 and µρ ∈ (0, 1), we can finally do the
following transformations:
B = inf
λ∈R, µ∈(0, 1
ρ
)
{
λρ
1− µρ
∣∣∣∣ ∀x ≥ 0 : λρ1− µρ ≥ ρ(x+ 1)
d − µρxd+1
1− µρ
}
= inf
µ∈(0, 1
ρ
)
{
max
x≥0
{
ρ(x+ 1)d − µρxd+1
1− µρ
}}
= inf
µ∈(0,1)
{
max
x≥0
{
ρ(x+ 1)d − µxd+1
1− µ
}}
(27)
Using expression (27) for B, we will next show that indeed B = Φd+1d,ρ . First, for the
B ≥ Φd+1d,ρ part, it is enough to observe that for any µ ∈ (0, 1):
max
x≥0
{
ρ(x+ 1)d − µxd+1
1− µ
}
≥ ρ(Φd,ρ + 1)
d − µΦd+1d,ρ
1− µ = Φ
d+1
d,ρ .
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For the B ≤ Φd+1d,ρ part now, first define the constant
µˆ :=
ρd(Φd,ρ + 1)
d−1
(d+ 1)Φdd,ρ
.
Using the fundamental property of the generalized golden ratio that Φd+1d,ρ = ρ(Φd,ρ + 1)
d, we
can now see that µˆ satisfies the following properties:
µˆ =
dΦd+1d,ρ
(d+ 1)(Φd,ρ + 1)Φ
d
d,ρ
=
dΦd,ρ
(d+ 1)(Φd,ρ + 1)
∈ (0, 1)
and
ρ(Φd,ρ + 1)
d − µˆΦd+1d,ρ
1− µˆ = Φ
d+1
d,ρ
Additionally, notice that by Lemma 11 we thus know that quantity ρ(x+ 1)d − µˆxd+1 is maxi-
mized for x being the unique solution of equation (26), which in our case is equivalent to
(x+ 1)d−1
xd
=
µˆ(d+ 1)
ρd
=
(Φd,ρ + 1)
d−1
Φdd,ρ
⇐⇒ x = Φd,ρ.
So, we can finally upper-bound B via (27) by
B ≤ max
x≥0
{
ρ(x+ 1)d − µˆxd+1
1− µˆ
}
=
ρ(Φd,ρ + 1)
d − µˆΦd+1d,ρ
1− µˆ = Φ
d+1
d,ρ .
B Remaining Proof of Theorem 3
In this section we show that the profiles s¯i−1 and s¯i of the game Γ¯ defined in the proof
of Theorem 3, indeed have the desired properties. Namely, s¯i−1 is an (α + p−1)-equilibrium
for all players in Ri, and furthermore,
Φ¯Ri(s¯
i) ≤ ΦRi(si) + nbi. (28)
Our analysis is essentially the same as in the proof of Caragiannis et al. [8, Lemma 4.3]; we still
present our derivation below, for completeness.
First, we need to show that no player in Ri = Xi ∪ Yi has an (α + p−1)-move at state
s¯i−1 of game Γ¯. Recall that all players use the same strategies under both s¯i−1 and si−1 and,
furthermore, the cost functions of the resources in these strategies are the same between the
two games Γ¯ and Γ. Also, observe that the cost of all players in Ri at si−1 is strictly less than
bi−1, otherwise they would have been “fixed” at the end of the (i − 1)-th phase (see Line 11
of Algorithm 1), contradicting the definition of Ri containing players that perform improving
moves during the i-th phase.
Consider first the players in Xi, whose cost by definition is at least bi at si−1. By the
analysis above, their costs actually have to lie within [bi, bi−1) at the end of the (i−1)-th phase.
Furthermore, their strategy sets (by the definition of Γ¯) are exactly the same in Γ¯ and Γ, and
thus, any (α + p−1)-move from s¯i−1 in Γ¯ would give rise to an (α + p−1)-move from si−1 in
Γ; such a move cannot exist, however, or otherwise, by the definition of our algorithm, there
would be still (α+ p−1)-moves left for the players in Xi at the end of phase (i+ 1) (see Line 9
of Algorithm 1).
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Consider now the remaining players in Yi, whose cost is less than bi. A unilateral deviation
from s¯i−1 of any such player u ∈ Yi, currently playing su, would cause her to use resources
s′u ∪ {eu} for some s′u 6= su. This will result in her experiencing a cost of at least wuceu(wu) =
wu · biwu = bi, which is strictly worse than her current cost.
Now we move on to prove (28). Recall that all players in N \ Yi use the same strategies
in s¯i and si. Also, each resource eu ∈ E¯ \ E can be used only by player u ∈ Yi, and thus
xN\Ri,eu(s¯
i) = 0 and xRi,eu(s¯
i) ≤ wu, and furthermore, from the definition of our potential in
(5), it is φeu(x) =
bi
wu
x. Putting all the above together and using the definition of the partial
potential (8), we can derive that
Φ¯Ri(s¯
i) =
∑
e∈E′
[
φe(xN\Ri, e(s¯
i) + xRi, e(s¯
i))− φe(xN\Ri, e(s¯i))
]
=
∑
e∈E
[
φe(xN\Ri, e(s¯
i) + xRi, e(s¯
i))− φe(xN\Ri, e(s¯i))
]
+
∑
u∈Yi
[
φeu(xN\Ri,eu(s¯
i) + xRi,eu(s¯
i))− φeu(xN\Ri,eu(s¯i)
]
= ΦRi(s
i) +
∑
u∈Yi
[φeu(xRi,eu(s¯
i))− φeu(0)]
≤ ΦRi(si) +
∑
u∈Yi
φeu(wu)
≤ ΦRi(si) + nbi.
C Proof of Lemma 10
We will first need a series of technical algebraic lemmas.
Lemma 12. For any ψ ∈ (0, 1] and all x > 0:
(1 + x)ψ − 1 ≥ ψx(1 + x)ψ−1.
Proof. Set α← ψ and z ← x+ 1 in [8, Claim 2.2].
Lemma 13. Consider reals ε, p > 0 and m ≥ 1, such that (1 + ε)m = 1 + p−1. Then,
ε−1 ≤ m(1 + p).
Proof. First, rearranging our assumption that (1 + ε)m = 1 + p−1, we get that
ε =
(
1 +
1
p
)1/m
− 1.
Thus, applying Lemma 12 with x← 1p and ψ ← 1m we can derive that:
ε ≥ 1
pm
(
1 +
1
p
)1/m−1
=
1
m(1 + p)
(
1 +
1
p
)1/m
≥ 1
m(1 + p)
,
which concludes the proof.
The following lemma builds the algebraic foundation of the derivation of Lemma 10.
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Lemma 14. Fix a positive integer d. For any polynomial f ∈ Pd and any ε > 0, it holds that
yf(z + x+ y) ≤ (1 + ε)yf(z + x′ + y) +
(
1 +
1
ε
)d
ddxf(z + x+ y′),
for any x, x′, y, y′, z ≥ 0.
Proof. Since f is a nondecreasing function, it is enough to show that (setting x′ ← 0, y′ ← 0)
yf(z + x+ y) ≤ (1 + ε)yf(z + y) +
(
1 +
1
ε
)d
ddxf(z + x)
and by performing the transformation f(t) ← f(z + t) (which preserves the property that
f ∈ Pd), it is actually enough to show that
yf(x+ y) ≤ (1 + ε)yf(y) +
(
1 +
1
ε
)d
ddxf(x). (29)
Looking at the structure of the above inequality, and taking into consideration that f is a linear
combination (with nonnegative coefficients) of monomials of degree at most d, we can deduce
that it is enough to show that (29) holds for any f(t) = tν with ν = 0, 1, . . . , d, that is,
y(x+ y)ν ≤ (1 + ε)yν+1 +
(
1 +
1
ε
)d
ddxν+1.
Dividing by xν+1 (if x = 0, the inequality holds trivially) and making a change of variables
z ← yx , this can be rewritten as
z(z + 1)ν − (1 + ε)zν+1 ≤
(
1 +
1
ε
)d
dd.
It is not difficult to check that the above inequality indeed holds for the extreme cases of z = 0
or ν = 0, so from now on let’s assume that z > 0 and ν is a positive integer. Now, taking into
consideration that ν ≤ d and that z ≤ z + 1, we can finally derive that it is enough to show
that
g(z) := (z + 1)ν+1 − (1 + ε)zν+1 ≤
(
1 +
1
ε
)ν
νν (30)
for all z > 0, where ν is a positive integer.
The derivative of g defined in (30) is g′(z) = (ν+1)[(z+1)ν−(1+ε)zν ], and so limz→0 g′(z) =
ν + 1 > 0, limz→∞ g′(z) = −∞ (because ε > 0) and
g′(z) = 0⇐⇒ (z + 1)
ν
zν
= 1 + ε⇐⇒ z = z¯ := 1
(1 + ε)1/ν − 1 . (31)
Thus, the maximum of g in (0,∞) is attained at z¯. Also, by applying Lemma 12 with ψ = 1/ν
and x = ε, we get that (1 + ε)1/ν − 1 ≥ 1ν ε(1 + ε)1/ν−1, and so we can bound z¯ in (31) by
z¯ ≤ ν 1
ε
(1 + ε)1−1/ν .
Using the above, together with the properties of z¯ from (31) we can finally bound
g(z) ≤ (z¯ + 1)ν+1 − (1 + ε)z¯ν+1
= (z¯ + 1) · (1 + ε)z¯ν − (1 + ε)z¯ν+1
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= (1 + ε)z¯ν
≤ (1 + ε)νν 1
εν
(1 + ε)ν−1
=
(
1 +
1
ε
)ν
νν ,
proving (30) and concluding the proof of our lemma.
We are finally ready to prove Lemma 10. Throughout this proof we will denote Q = Ri∪{u}.
Then we can write
Cu(s
i) =
∑
e∈E
xu, e(s
i) · ce(xN\Q, e(si) + xRi, e(si) + xu, e(si))
and
Cu(s
i−1) =
∑
e∈E
xu, e(s
i) · ce(xN\Q, e(si) + xRi, e(si−1) + xu, e(si)),
where for the second equality we used that, for any resource e, it is xN\Q, e(si) = xN\Q, e(si−1)
and xu, e(si) = xu, e(si−1); this is a consequence of the fact that only players in Ri move during
phase i, i.e., between states si−1 and si. This is also exactly the reason why the partial potential
of Ri can only decrease during phase i (due to Lemma 6 and the fact that players perform at
least α-improvements). Thus ΦRi(s
i−1) ≥ ΦRi(si) = Φ(si)−ΦN\Ri(si) and so we can also write
ΦRi(s
i−1) ≥
∑
e∈E
[
φe(xN\Q, e(s
i) + xRi, e(s
i) + xu, e(s
i))− φe(xN\Q, e(si) + xu, e(si))
]
≥
∑
e∈E
xRi, e(s
i) · ce(xN\Q, e(si) + xRi, e(si) + xu, e(si)),
the last inequality being due to Lemma 4.
Observing the above expressions, we see that in order to prove (18) it is enough to show
that, for any resource e, it is
xu, e(s
i)ce(xN\Q, e(s
i) + xRi, e(s
i) + xu, e(s
i))
≤ (1 + ε)xu, e(si−1)ce(xN\Q, e(si−1) + xRi, e(si−1) + xu, e(si−1))
+ ξεxRi, e(s
i)ce(xN\Q, e(s
i) + xRi, e(s
i) + xu, e(s
i)).
Substituting, for simplicity, y ← xu, e(si), x← xRi, e(si), x′ ← xRi, e(si−1) and z ← xN\Q, e(si),
this becomes
yce(z + x+ y) ≤ (1 + ε)yce(z + x′ + y) + ξεxce(z + x+ y),
which indeed holds, due to Lemma 14.
We now move to proving (19), which can be equivalently rewritten as
Cu(s
i−1
−u , s
′
u) ≤ (1 + ε)Cu(si−u, s′u) + ξεΦRi(si−1). (32)
We have that
Cu(s
i−1
−u , s
′
u) =
∑
e∈E
xu, e(s
i−1
−u , s
′
u) · ce(xN\Q, e(si−1−u , s′u) + xRi, e(si−1−u , s′u) + xu, e(si−1−u , s′u))
=
∑
e∈E
xu, e(s
i
−u, s
′
u) · ce(xN\Q, e(si−1−u ) + xRi, e(si−1−u ) + xu, e(si−u, s′u))
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and
Cu(s
i
−u, s
′
u) =
∑
e∈E
xu, e(s
i
−u, s
′
u) · ce(xN\Q, e(si−u, s′u) + xRi, e(si−u, s′u) + xu, e(si−u, s′u))
=
∑
e∈E
xu, e(s
i
−u, s
′
u) · ce(xN\Q, e(si−1−u ) + xRi, e(si−u, s′u) + xu, e(si−u, s′u)).
For the simplifications above we used the equalities
xu, e(s
i−1
−u , s
′
u) = xu, e(s
i
−u, s
′
u)
xRi, e(s
i−1
−u , s
′
u) = xRi, e(s
i−1)
xN\Q, e(s
i−1
−u , s
′
u) = xN\Q, e(s
i
−u, s
′
u) = xN\Q, e(s
i−1),
which are consequences of the fact that all players except those in Ri have the same strategies
in (si−u, s
′
u) and (s
i−1
−u , s
′
u), and all players but u have the same strategies in state s
i−1 and
(si−1−u , s
′
u).
Thus, in an analogous way in which we proved (18) before, we can see that in order to prove
(32) it is enough to show that for any resource e it is
yce(z + x+ y) ≤ (1 + ε)yce(z + x′ + y) + ξεxce(z + x+ y′),
where we have used the following substitutions: x ← xRi, e(si−1), x′ ← xRi, e(si−u, s′u), y ←
xu, e(s
i−1
−u , s
′
u), y
′ ← xu, e(si−1) and z ← xN\Q, e(si). The above is indeed true, again due to
Lemma 14.
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